Geopolitics, Trust and the 2026 Strategy Test

As we start 2026, most leaders and decision-makers in government, business, and investment will be looking for clear signals to help them mitigate risk and drive growth. The coming year is going to be, at the very least, interesting.

Yet many organisations still do not invest seriously in understanding how geopolitics influences their strategy, shapes their opportunities, or constrains their operating environment.

Geopolitics now behaves less like background context and more like an operating constraint: shaping what you can build, where you can invest, which partnerships are acceptable, and how quickly confidence can evaporate when perception flips.

That would be manageable if trust were abundant. It is not.

We are entering a year in which the economics of trust, the politics of technology, and the fragility of global trade converge into a single strategic conversation. Leaders who continue to treat reputation as an output of communications and geopolitics as a paragraph in the risk register will discover they have miscategorised the problem.

The most material risks are not only what happens, but how it is interpreted, by whom, and how quickly that interpretation turns into a decision: a blocked deal, a delayed procurement, a new regulatory requirement, an employee walkout, or a funding round that suddenly becomes harder to justify.

So here is the test that matters for government leaders, technology executives, and investors across CVC, VC, and family offices:

Can your strategy survive scrutiny from regulators, citizens, employees, customers, and rival states at the same time?

If the honest answer is “not sure”, that is a good place to start. Strategy begins with realism, not reassurance.

These are the signals I believe leaders need to read differently as we move into 2026. None is novel in isolation. What is changing is how they compound, with trust and perception acting as the transmission mechanism.

1) Multipolarisation is now operational, not theoretical

The Munich Security Report 2025 used the term multipolarisation to describe today’s international order: more centres of gravity, more competing models, and widening divisions that make collective responses harder.

This matters because ‘multipolar’ is not simply a description of who has power. It describes how quickly your organisation can become a political object.

In a more contested world, partnership choices are no longer read only as commercial decisions. They are read as signals. Supply chains are no longer only about efficiency. They are about exposure.

Corporate neutrality, once considered prudent, is increasingly interpreted as evasive, particularly when questions touch national capability, dual-use technology, data sovereignty, or capital sources.

This is where reputation becomes operational.

A company may believe it is ‘staying out of politics’, but stakeholders will still assign intent. Governments may believe a policy is technical, but it will still be interpreted through domestic grievance and external suspicion. Investors may think they are simply allocating capital, but in strategic sectors, they are increasingly treated as political actors.

Multipolarisation does not mean choosing sides in every argument. It means clarity about the boundaries of your behaviour, as others will test them for you.

Practical implication for 2026:

Write down your non-negotiables and make them legible. Not in a 40-page policy document, but in a page that can survive stress. If you cannot explain your red lines simply, you will not be able to defend them quickly when challenged.

2) Geo-economics hardens into enforceable friction

The second signal is the continued conversion of economic policy into national security policy.

It rarely arrives with drama. It arrives through process: screening, licensing, procurement clauses, source-of-funds questions, and export controls that tighten incrementally, then bite suddenly.

Two indicators capture the direction of travel.

First, investment screening is now mainstream. The OECD reports that more than four out of five OECD members operate investment screening mechanisms. This is not a technical footnote. It changes how deals are timed, justified, and perceived. Intent is now assessed alongside structure.

Second, capital flows are under pressure. UNCTAD reports that global foreign direct investment fell by 11% in 2024 to $1.5 trillion, marking a second consecutive year of decline. Less patient capital increases competition for ‘clean’ capital and heightens suspicion of unclear objectives.

Now connect this to technology.

In the most strategically sensitive sectors, rules are moving faster than many executives admit. Export controls and counter-diversion expectations in advanced computing and semiconductors have been tightened repeatedly, with a precise policy aim: prevent strategic advantage leaking through the gaps.

This is not simply about compliance. It is about deal viability and operating freedom.

In 2026, more transactions will be slowed, reshaped, or abandoned not because they are illegal, but because they are politically difficult, reputationally fragile, or poorly explained.

Practical implication for 2026:

Treat deal readiness as a strategic capability. Combine legal diligence with political and perception diligence. Map screening triggers early. Identify who can derail a deal informally. Shape the perception of a transaction at the same time as you structure it.

3) Trust scarcity is becoming the baseline condition

This is where the argument becomes uncomfortable.

Many leaders still behave as if trust is the default, and reputation is something you lose only if you behave badly. The evidence suggests the opposite. Distrust is increasingly ambient, and legitimacy must be earned repeatedly.

The World Economic Forum continues to rank misinformation and disinformation among the most significant short-term risks, explicitly linking them to the erosion of trust and governance. Edelman’s Trust Barometer describes a widening ‘crisis of grievance’ that stifles growth and innovation.

In low-trust conditions, stakeholders interpret events through suspicion. Narratives form faster and are harder to correct. Regulatory appetite shifts towards visible toughness, even where nuance would deliver better outcomes.

This is also where the information environment becomes a corporate risk, not just a social one. Disinformation increasingly targets firms, founders, funds, and deal counterparties.

What leaders believe privately and what decision-makers assume quietly matter as much as public reputation.

The cost of generating plausible falsehoods continues to decline. Verification still takes time. That asymmetry is now structural.

Practical implication for 2026:

Shift from messaging to evidence. Build trust infrastructure: governance, independent oversight, transparent standards, and escalation protocols for misinformation events. In 2026, trust will belong to organisations whose claims are verifiable, not merely well-phrased.

4) AI governance moves from opinion to timetable

AI has spent the last two years living in a fog of hype, fear, and ideology. Towards the end of last year, there were signs of a potential AI bubble.

2026 introduces a different dynamic: deadlines.

The EU AI Act entered into force in August 2024 and will be fully applicable in August 2026, with some obligations applying earlier. That alone should change planning cycles for firms operating in or selling into Europe.

It also matters far beyond Europe. Regulatory gravity travels through procurement, supply chains, and global standards. Firms based elsewhere are already being asked for EU-aligned assurance because it reduces buyer risk.

For investors, this is a value and exit issue, not simply a legal one. Companies that cannot evidence governance will struggle with regulated customers, face greater litigation exposure, and see exit routes narrow.

In a low-trust environment, ‘responsible AI’ as a slogan invites scrutiny rather than confidence.

Leaders will be judged on accountability: the models used, how they are tested, the data they rely on, and how incidents are handled.

Practical implication for 2026:

Treat AI governance as a board-level capability. Inventory use cases, including shadow use. Assign accountable owners. Document controls and monitoring. Build an evidence trail that survives scrutiny.

5) Strategic policy-making: reducing market friction

A persistent but under-emphasised signal for 2026 is the need for policy-making itself to become more strategic.

Too often, regulation in areas such as technology, trade, investment screening, and industrial policy is developed in vertical silos, with limited cross-sector oversight. The result is friction within markets and between markets: slower investment, higher compliance costs, and dampened competitiveness.

OECD analysis and business surveys consistently show that regulatory complexity and inconsistency impose measurable burdens on firms and public administration. When policy is written in isolation, the cumulative effect is not just administrative cost, but strategic drag.

For 2026, this matters because investors and technology leaders increasingly price in not just the content of rules, but the coherence and predictability of policy environments.

Practical implication for 2026:

Treat regulatory clarity as a competitive asset. Engage early in cross-government and cross-industry reviews that prioritise coherence and remove unnecessary friction.

6) Hybrid shocks are the new normal

Finally, assume disruption will arrive as a bundle, not a single event.

Critical mineral supply chains remain concentrated, while investment momentum is weakening. At the same time, cyber pressure on public institutions and critical systems is intensifying.

Now connect the dots.

A supply disruption can become a political crisis. A cyber incident can become a legitimacy crisis. Both can be amplified through misinformation and grievance.

When systems fail, the public question is rarely just ‘what happened?’ It becomes ‘were you negligent, naïve, or dishonest?’

Reputation is not the aftermath. It is part of the incident.

Practical implication for 2026:

Run hybrid stress tests that combine operational disruption with narrative pressure. If your crisis planning assumes incidents arrive one at a time, it is built for a world that no longer exists.

The connective tissue: perception is now the delivery mechanism

Taken together, these signals indicate a change in how power operates.

In 2026, outcomes will be shaped less by what you claim and more by whether your behaviour is interpreted as credible under pressure. Perception and trust convert geopolitics into regulatory action, disinformation into commercial friction, and technology governance into market access.

Reputation is not a veneer. It is a form of strategic resilience.

If you lead an organisation operating across government, strategic technology, or cross-border capital, the question for 2026 is not ‘how do we look?’

It is: how do we hold?

A 90-day agenda for leaders

If I were advising a leadership team preparing for 2026, I would start with three moves:

• Codify your non-negotiables. Make them usable under pressure.

• Build deal and partnership legitimacy early. Do not outsource perception to the end of the process.

• Invest in trust infrastructure. Assume misinformation will be part of the next crisis.

This is not about caution. It is about deliberateness.

In a low-trust, high-friction world, the organisations that win are not those with the loudest messaging. They are those whose strategy survives scrutiny and whose leadership can move quickly with evidence when the environment turns hostile.